

A SURVEY OF STATE PAPERS

(Transfer of Power 1942 - 47-W/S-1-7)

by
S. R. Tikekar

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(*Transfer of Power 1942-47-Vols. 1-7*)

By S. R. TIKEKAR

Let me at the outset pay my humble tribute to the revered memory of Lala Lajpat Rai, whom we respected as the Lion of the Punjab, and in whose name the series of talks is instituted. Although I had no opportunity of personally coming into contact with the great patriot, I have with great admiration appreciated the work of the Servants of the People Society in Lahore during my visits to the capital of the Punjab.

I must also express my thanks to the Trustees who have given me this opportunity of appearing before you to talk about the official publications which have evoked universal admiration. The British withdrawal from India has hardly any parallel in world history. The story of that withdrawal as told by official papers gains special significance to students of administration in general and of Indian nationalism in particular. For these reasons, I have chosen the subject: *A Survey of State Papers: Transfer of Power 1942-47, Vols 1-7. The Viceroy's Journal*, as edited by Sir P. Moon, has been of a great supplementary use.

It is not without significance that the British Government, decided to publish these papers, after obtaining the parliamentary sanction. Usually, state papers are made public, after 50 years but the papers relating to the transfer of power begin from 1942. The British Government decided to publish these as a part of their official policy to make available documents on the transfer of power in India. The parliamentary sanction to such a scheme was accorded in June 1967 and the work started in right earnest. The usual difficulties faced the learned editors about the way in which the papers were to be presented, topically or chronologically? In the end, chronological arrangement was decided on and documents were serially numbered. A topical guide was appended for each volume as part of the contents, which proved to be an excellent reading aid.

In addition, every volume is provided with a list of principal officers of the governments concerned, a brief chronology of relevant events, a list of abbreviations used, a glossary of Indian terms, and two indexes: (i) of persons and (ii) of topics. The reference in the index throughout is to the number of the documents and not to the page, which is not a great convenience. That's the only fault I find with the publication. Since the entire matter was prepared for the press in one bunch in advance, this was the only way to do it. Cross references are provided wherever necessary and useful footnotes explaining the topic are added. One has nothing but admiration for the Editors for their great effort. They have surely provided a model for making avail-

able state papers to the public. Incidentally, this is the method followed by the German and the French governments in publishing their respective state papers relating to the global conflagration of 1914-18.

Dr. Mansergh and Dr. Lumby were the first editors and they deserve the gratitude of the students and readers for their excellent plan and all the reading aids provided for such a material. Unfortunately, Dr. Lumby died in January 1972 when Vol. 4 was in an advanced stage in printing and it is appropriately dedicated to his memory. Sir Perendel Moon was appointed in Mr. Lumby's place and from the 5th Vol. onwards, his name appears along with that of Dr. Mansergh. Wavell papers were also edited by Sir Perendel and having served in India for 15 years as an ICS officer and later at the Planning Commission, he had the unique advantage of knowing India and Indians, at close quarters.

The extent of the state papers in these 7 volumes is quite imposing, with about 8100 pages of print, making in all a little less than 4800 documents. And this covers only three fourths of the story, considering the time factor. The 7 vols. extend over a period of little more than four years, five months, (=1600 days) from January 1942 to June 1946 and it is obvious that we have yet to march upto 15th August 1947 to complete the Transfer of Power. That is about 400 days more. Very likely two more volumes will be required to cover the period or perhaps three.

The outstanding impression one gets from a cursory glance of the 7 vols. of state papers is about the great awareness of archival importance. How all the papers were carefully preserved and how they are now made available, must be considered a great achievement. Although the preservation of the **daftars** is a recent technique, we in Maharashtra, with rich archives in Bcmbay, Poona and elsewhere, have been using such material for study and research for quite some time now. But it must be admitted that proper care on such "dead" treasure came to be bestowed only during the British regime. Arranging such old records became a specialised profession and Keepers of Records, at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were high officials of the British Government. Although we have continued the respective departments under new names, I have no hesitation in admitting that neither our elected ministers nor the counterparts of the ICS officers, have shown any adequate awareness of the importance of archives. The result was a neglect all round of our Records. When some of the students were working on Sardar Patel or on Jawaharlal Nehru, considerable difficulty was experienced by them in getting some important papers, which our Archives were not able to supply. Why, the great difficulty in tracing some of Mahatma Gandhi's papers during his detention and arrest at Poona, is indicative of the condition of archives under **Swarajya**. Many of the files which were overdue to be sent to Archives, have not moved out of the Sachivalaya, where the offices are crammed. And the newcomers are not expected to know what the old files are about or their archival importance. They find no precedent for transferring old files to the Records Office.

Bombay records then are not what they should be. It is less known that the building in which both the Elphinstone College and the Records Office are located, was originally a Records Office building as will be clear from the memorial slab at the entrance. When there was a plan to shift the Records Office somewhere, to make room for the growing Elphinstone College, the Government's attention was drawn to the fact that the building was a Records Office building, much to the chagrin of the then Principal of the Elphinstone College.

That in short is the story of neglect and ignorance of the functions of archives. While in U. K. efforts are being made to preserve commercial archives also for making them available to academic students, we in India are not paying proper attention to our own official archives. In the light of the sanctity about state papers and the disregard to the rules governing their publication, *Correspondence of Sardar Patel Vols I-10*,* indicates our refusal to be self-disciplined. Official apathy too is strikingly seen, in not taking any action against this blatant infringement of Government Copyright.

What should be official papers and what should be the private papers of the retiring officers from India, was a point raised by Viceroy Lord Wavell and a note about it is appended at the end of the Vol. IV. (p. 1236-46).

The other merit of the state papers under survey is the great and intelligent care the editors have bestowed on the preparation of these volumes. One is simply struck by the number and variety of foot notes.

When any slight difference was noted in the texts of the same document, it was noted carefully. It is likely, there was some difficulty in deciphering the coded message. Perhaps it was the typists' variation. At times, it was a genuine mistake of the writer himself in mentioning the date or name; perhaps the spellings were different. Whatever the difference it was noted in foot notes, showing the careful editing, by actually comparing the versions available. Such a first step, in publishing official documents is seldom seen else where. It is fashionable with us to avoid comparing of the texts which involves keeping two persons engaged on a simple job. This extraordinary care is strikingly evident when one looks at any page.

Cross references to previous documents are equally striking. They are again to the documents and not to pages. Even reference to previous volumes are given, showing consideration for the student reader. And this is the dominating factor of all the documents reproduced. Nothing more requires to be provided. It is quite in keeping with the times of instant foods and instant drinks. Reading under such conditions is a pleasure, which has no substitute.

To me personally, these state papers have a special attraction. Living in Simla and Delhi during almost half the period and moving in high official circles, I was particularly, re-living the times and conditions. With easy access to what was then known as Counter-Propaganda Directorate, monitoring broadcasts from friendly and enemy countries, to India, about India, in

many languages, I could be in touch with the wireless world of those days. An official summary was daily supplied to us under double sealed covers, with instructions to burn the papers after reading.

On knowing Lord Mountbatten's statement that he had interviewed about 140 Indian leaders and made notes for every interview in preparation for the transfer of power, I had requested the authorities in Delhi whom I knew well, to have a book made out of these interviews. The Publications Division, the National Archives and others were approached in this matter. Having no satisfactory reply from our Capital, I approached Lord Mountbatten himself for a copy of those texts. The reply from the noble Lord was prompt and fully satisfactory. His records had been handed over to the Government and to obtain copies from them would require quite a long time. Besides, the duplicating costs were high and his advice to me was to wait for a publication of the *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, series of volumes. This then was my first introduction to these state papers. (July 1970). Ruling India from *White Hall*, London, is a common phrase used while discussing Anglo-Indian relations. You get ample evidence in these volumes about the truth of that statement. Why, it seems to be carried to ridiculous extremes when the matter was about *Gandhi*. The Viceroy, Secretary of State for India, and other senior members of the British cabinet, had hardly any say in the matter of how *Gandhi*'s letter should be acknowledged if at all. And if it was, the draft was approved by Winston Churchill himself. Whether the British PM was on the European front or whether he was in the United States, or whether he was preparing for the meeting of the big four, "somewhere in the Middle East" it did not matter. *Gandhi* was a topic specially reserved for the PM's attention. No body dared suggest anything about *Gandhi* to him. The correspondence it must be "clear the line" wireless message all the way in those days on this topic *Gandhi*, that is found in less these volumes. That it could make a compact little book, showing how the semi-naked fakir, an acknowledged apostle of peace, dominated the world politics, in those war days.

Another official requirement kept the name of *Gandhi* humming all over the wireless world. All such messages were repeated to Chungking and Washington for the information of British Government representatives there.

These messages were handled with extreme care and greatest precaution was taken in transmission. It is interesting to learn how they were communicated. In the first place they were all in cipher, and for military use. They were handled by high military officers as they were between the highest defence commanders. On the Indian side they were addressed to Field Marshall Wavell and at the London end they were in the name of General Brooke. They were stamped : *Most immediate : Most secret*. After these double warnings there was the word *PRIVATE*, to indicate that it was not connected with the military operations. The message began as "OFFICER, decipher, *Private*, for F.M. Wavell, deliver personally to Viceroy for his eyes only. Then the actual message was conveyed with the opening expression : *BEGINS*:

After the message was complete, the last word was ENDS. Between these two words, the entire message was for the Viceroy's eyes only.

For the return journey, similar instructions were repeated and instead of F.M. Wavell, General Brooke appeared there to pass on the message to the PM personally, for his eyes only.

Such a well planned precaution was justified during the days because wireless message could be tapped by any one catching the proper wavelength. The cipher code was the safe-guard and even during peace times Indians were rarely employed in the cipher department. Coding and decoding was done only by British civilian or military officers.

Two other qualities of these wonderfully kept British Records become strikingly clear while reading them.

First, the language. It is good English prose as it should be written by those whose mother tongue it is. Whatever the level of our acquisition of it by University standards, we remain foreigners to its native idiom and usage.

In our times, it is becoming increasingly difficult to read any of our languages or English for that matter, as they ought to be written in their respective native idiom. All our expressions, be they from Marathi, Gujarati and other languages or in the *Rashtra Bhasha* seem to be equally widely influenced by the English idiom and syntax. To an extent they are jarring. The current official English prose, meant exclusively for effective communication is in evidence here and it is such a pleasure to read it.

The other quality is that of a gentleman. The real meaning of a gentleman is seen here while dealing with men, even with an opponent like Mahatma Gandhi. Admittedly, the greatness of the Mahatma was not realised by any of the British officials. He was considered the Enemy No. 1 of Britain. And yet the treatment meted out to him was gentlemanly throughout. This becomes the more striking because of our recent knowledge of how political prisoners were treated, under Swarajya, during the dark days of emergency by another "Gandhi."

The examples of retiring Viceroys and other high officials handing over their correspondence, diaries and other papers to public institutions for safe custody and study must also be commended to our brothers in India. On the whole, in matters of keeping records and preserving them, we have yet miles and miles to go. It is this feeling of the great distance that becomes clearly marked while going through the pages of these volumes.

We have been talking about delegation of authority and making the man on the spot the best judge of the situation. The British administration did not seem to conform to the wisdom of these observations, as far as Indian affairs were concerned. The Viceroy was the highest paid officer of the Crown in India; how subservient he was made to Downing Street or White Hall is best seen in these volumes. For every little thing, the Viceroy had to be in touch with the Secretary of State and the correspondence between them has grown so considerably that one really wonders at the wisdom of appointing such a highly paid Viceroy with so little power. Was it intended to patronise the British Telegraph Company?

Diagressing a little, it is relevant to note that Lokmanya B G Tilak (1856-1920) was the first Indian editor who openly criticised this British policy, while taking stock of Lord Landsdowne's achievements. Tilak's burning expression is worth quoting : : "If the Viceroy, has to say Yes, to what the Secretary of State proposes, why then have a highly paid Viceroy drawing Rs. 20,000/- a month ? Even a clerk at Rs. 200 p.m. would serve the purpose well. It is not possible that the Parliament which appoints the Viceroy at Rs. 20,000 p.m. would not consider what he has to say on matters of state policy." (Marathi Speeches, Vol 1 p. 263-68; 30-1-94).

Both the Viceroys, Linlithgow and Wavell, who held office during the period covered by these volumes, give ample proof of their resentment of this highly White Hall dominated British policy. Handling of the case of Gandhi's correspondence with Viceroy, was the sole responsibility, not of the Viceroy, but of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In these volumes, there are many occasions when Churchill dictated from wherever he was, how a letter from Gandhi should be acknowledged. This insistence of the Prime Minister was not to the liking of many of his cabinet colleagues. But the war time British sense of discipline kept their dislike suppressed.

Once Lord Linlithgow, was anxious to acknowledge Gandhi's letter, as an ordinary official would do. But the imperial dictate thundered voicelessly on the Viceroy from Churchill

"Your decision (to write to Gandhi as you want) will bring our whole Government, both in India and here into ridicule and thus cloud the magnificent work you have done in these 7 years. I bear the chief responsibility." (Vol. III-424,18-2-1943).

But in the case of Wavell, Churchill was more haughty and harsh. There were many reasons why Wavell had fallen from the grace of Churchill. Admittedly, the military Viceroy was appointed only for the duration of war. To win war against Japan with American help was the main object and India's location lent it an importance to this great offensive, almost the final phase of the World War II. Wavell therefore ought not to bother himself about civilian matters. That's how perhaps Churchill was thinking. To his great surprise, the Viceroy started very differently. His sympathy for the Indian aspirations was too much for the British Prime Minister to tolerate. Churchill was offended by other actions of Wavell.

(1) Field Marshall Wavell was favourably inclined towards Indian Nationalism while Churchill was openly saying that he would not advise H M G to liquidate the British Empire. (2) Wavell was instrumental in releasing Gandhi on medical grounds ; but Gandhi soon recovered and was in correspondence with the Viceroy, H M the King's representative in India. Negotiating with a semi-naked Fakir, who was Britain's Enemy No. 1, was insulting to British prestige according to Churchill. (3) Wavell had strongly objected to the Cabinet decision to increase allowances to British forces fighting in the Far East. (4) He had submitted a plan to the British Cabinet about political reforms to India and was eager to explain it personally. To Churchill this was unnecessary meddling into civil affairs by a Field Marshall,

(5) The Viceroy had been insisting on having an Indian Finance Minister.
 (6) The Viceroy used to write direct letters to His Majesty the King reporting about the conditions in the Indian Empire and the progress of the people. Since the appointment of the Viceroy was by H M the King, it was quite in order that the Crown Representative be in touch with H. M. But the British Prime Minister thought this was by-passing him.

The list is not a long one; but the bad blood it created could be seen only after reading the documents connected with each of the events. H M G's announcement about pay increase of the British fighting forces in the East, was described by Wavell as "intolerable and stupid." He further observed: If H M G has to bribe British forces to fight in Far East, they should pay the bill.

The Viceroy could not control his indignation at the utter neglect of the Government of India in this matter. He therefore wrote "It is monstrous that India wasn't consulted about these important proposals. H M G make things most difficult for the Government of India especially the C-in-C and myself by bouncing us in this way."
 (V- 11, 14, 15, 29, 32 & 44 September-October 1944)

Here incidentally, the word bribe as applied to British soldiers offended Churchill and he protested to the Viceroy about the expression. Wavell was no *kuchha* reed; he was himself every inch a soldier for more than 40 years. He stated that no offence was meant for the soldier, but the folly of the Government, in not consulting India was being highlighted.

As a typical case of a prolonged hair-splitting between London and New Delhi, over a short letter from Gandhiji to the Viceroy, will be well worth study. Wavell sent to London a copy of Gandhiji's letter of 15th July, 1944, followed by another cable, embodying his proposed reply to the Mahatma on 1st August. Both the papers were considered by the War Cabinet on 2nd August and certain amendments to the reply of the Viceroy to Gandhi were suggested. Next day again, the War Cabinet considered the correspondence and suggested further changes in the draft reply. The Cabinet thought that it would be best to "stiffen the tone" of the reply. A general piece of advice while dealing with Indians was tendered. "It was better to combine utmost firmness with great politeness and scrupulous observance of form." The British Prime Minister then administered a good dose of advice to the Viceroy and insisted on reconsideration of his reply to Gandhi again by a special committee of the Cabinet.

Meanwhile the Viceroy was urging early approval of his draft reply to Gandhi. As Gandhi and Jinnah were meeting soon, the Viceroy was anxious that his reply should reach Gandhi before the meeting. In reply to the Prime Minister's dose of advice, the Viceroy did some plain speaking. He was not doing any thing revolutionary in replying to Gandhi. "It would be wrong from every point of view for H M G to adopt an entirely negative attitude." In disgust the Viceroy added that the Prime Minister could trust the Viceroy and the C-in - C to see that the war effort was not prejudiced in any way.

But the deliberations of the Cabinet Committee produced not one, but two different drafts and the option to use either was left to the Viceroy.

The Viceroy however was not a man to be so easily won over to sign on the dotted line. He cabled back to say that "You (Secretary of State) must be prepared to accept the advice of the man on the spot in this matter." When the War Cabinet met to consider this latest cable from the Viceroy, the Prime Minister was away in Italy and so it was decided to wait for his return.

Meanwhile, the over-eager Viceroy cabled again: "Gandhi's letter was addressed to me and I consider myself entitled to reply to it, provided I keep within the War Cabinet's policy and instructions given to me before I left for India." The Secretary of State was in agreement with the Viceroy and he called the Cabinet discussion "a silly business." As the Cabinet Committee was considering the cables from the Viceroy, Churchill cabled to them to stand firm and not be disturbed by the attitude of the Viceroy. Ultimately the War Cabinet re-affirmed its previous decision: the Viceroy was free to send either of the drafts to Gandhi as his reply. At this meeting the Secretary of State wanted his dissent to be recorded as "the matter was not of a broad policy but of wording or tone." He was also not in favour of overriding the repeatedly expressed opinion of the Viceroy who was in touch with the whole Indian situation."

On the other hand the Secretary whispered into the Viceroy's ears that these small differences were not sufficient ground for a head-on collision which could be justified on a major issue of policy. Ultimately, the long drawn battle of wits came to a quiet end when the Viceroy sent the longer draft as his reply to Gandhi. But he confided to the Secretary of State: It is discouraging work to serve an obviously hostile Cabinet who seem to have no confidence at all in my judgement on any matter (IV - Nos. 614-60-Aug. 1944).

Gandhiji whether under detention or as a freeman, dominates these volumes and references to him are numerous. A little more than 10 columns are devoted to M K Gandhi in the Indexes of all the 7 vols. The Mahatma had undoubtedly the knack of turning limelight on himself, whatever happened. The freedom to express himself, whether under government custody or as a free man, was utilised fully by Gandhiji. Most of the letters were political. But there were some personal letters also. For instance, Gandhiji wrote to Linlithgow two letters during 1942 as a free citizen. One was about All India Spinners Association and the other about alleged cow slaughter on a huge scale in Bihar for the troops. Income tax department had levied Rs. 5 lakhs as tax for AISA's business. That it was a charitable institution was not accepted even by the High Court, which had confirmed the imposition. Mahatmaji had preferred an appeal to the Privy Council (although boycott of courts was a part of the non-co-operation movement).

In his letter to the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, Mahatmaji requested to waive the income tax. (I-87 p. 135, 8-2-42). The Viceroy replied that relief was not possible in such cases; only stay order till Privy Council's decision was possible and was issued. It seems that the trust papers were not in order

and hence the AISA was not considered a charitable institution. It was highly unlikely that the legal brains available to the AISA, including Gandhiji himself, would leave such a wide loophole. (I - 156 p. 212 - 20-2-42).

The other letter from Gandhiji was about stoppage of cow-slaughter. (II-215, p. 303, 2-7-42). After enquiries, the Viceroy was convinced that Gandhiji's complaint was real. But the way in which the Viceroy replied shows the evasive beauty of official English language. "No one is keener than I am to prevent the slaughter of milch cattle or working bullocks. But though I think there is some thing in the complaint which you have brought to my notice, and though I suppose perfection will not be attained, I have now taken steps which will I hope result in reducing to quite insignificant proportions any future accidents of this kind." (II-325; p. 458-25-7-42).

One would have felt that the correspondence would not have gone further than that. But, No, the Mahatma must show that he fully appreciates the good work done by the Viceroy. Thanks were due to him on behalf of the dumb cow. God's blessings also were sought for the kind act. (II-337; p.469 - 27-7-42)

Problems of vital interest to Indian administration are included in these volumes and it would be better to list them for those who want make a special study of them. First and foremost the Bengal famine and the consequent problem of food sufficiency of India, of Bengal in particular. Total imports of rice from neighbouring countries of S.E. Asia, was another question which engaged the Viceregal attention. Health statistics of Bengal, growth of crime in Bengal due to famine were problems that were considered and some statistics drawn from them. Incidence of terrorist crime and the result of the Quit India movement as seen from the number of N C O prisoners, for all India. Formation of the Indian Army, contribution by regions and composition by communities, must be considered delicate questions. But most important from the financial point of view, was the question of sterling balances. For services rendered and materials supplied for the prosecution of war payment was made by British Govt. to India that constituted the sterling balances.

How great was India's contribution, can be seen from the constant worry of British politicians to grab some portion of that huge pile. It must be said to the credit of the Secretary of State, the Viceroy and the Indian Finance Member--they were all British--that they fought for India against the Home Government and did not allow any cuts to be made in it.

It is well known that with the entry of Japan on the side of the Axis Powers, and with the shifting of the offensive thrust from Europe to Asian soil and Indian Ocean, some of the amount could be charged to Indian account as for her defence. But all that had to be done with the full consent of the Indian Government. It is doubtful whether Indian members of the War Committee would have stood up for their rights as boldly and as firmly as did the three high British officials (being paid out of Indian treasury?) against the strong H M G pressure. This study may be undertaken to fully appreciate the stand of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. Another study

of whether the sterling balances were properly utilised or not by free India would be far more useful.

With the shifting of the theatre of War from Europe to Asia and passing of the supply line through India to China over the Burmese hump, presence of US troops in India increased rapidly. In the wake of soldiers came newspapermen, War correspondents, and high-civilian officials to look after them. Hence the American interest in India, in keeping Indians on the side of Allies much to the strong dislike and resentment of Linlithgow. His anti-Americanism must be seen in the original. Lord Linlithgow, like Churchill, believed and believed very strongly that India was the sole private preserve of Britain and that the Americans, who were but birds of passage for the duration of fighting, had no right whatever to meddle in Indian affairs. Time and again the Viceroy cabled to London to ask the British Prime Minister to write to the American President. Requests were made to the British Ambassador in the States to reduce this American interest in Indian affairs if it could not be stopped altogether. Attention had been drawn on many times to the curious American correspondents and to the authorised representatives of the President, that India's foreign relations were looked after by H M G and that India was not free to entertain American diplomats or correspondents. Requests for meeting Gandhiji under Government custody, or even as a free man, would not be granted.

The British were wanting Indians to realise the responsibility of making the Constitution for themselves. To facilitate the transfer of power, many plans were proposed and discussed at length. The Cripps' plan was there and the Cabinet had produced its own blue print. There were draft bills prepared by the India Office. Wavell's Breakdown Plan and the Delegation's Plan were there. In addition, the Bombay (Tata-Birla) Plan, M. N. Roy's plan and others figure in the correspondence. These were for framing the Constitution as well for postwar reconstruction of Indian industries and development. Books that would help making the constitution are also suggested (IV 670; 23-8-44)

The Cabinet Delegation within four weeks of their arrival, met representatives of 47 different bodies placing their views about the proposed constitution. During the summer heat of Delhi, that must have been a trying ordeal. That was an indication of their sincerity.

Making of a constitution was one of the main objectives of the transfer of power. Whether there would be one or more bodies engaged in making of the constitution remained to be seen. The British politicians who came to India and who were charged with the function, did their best to have one united party with whom all negotiations for a real transfer of power could be carried out.

Some of the views expressed by high officials sound funny today, after we have actually worked our constitution during the past 27 years or so. Although we have had 42 amendments to the Constitution, we haven't fared badly as was feared by the Viceroy.

Wavell thought that "universal suffrage in India would only make confusion worse confounded." (IV-607 p. 1125-31, 27-7-44). Sir P Moon, however, held that "parliamentary democracy was unsuited for India. It should be replaced by a chain of councils for the village, the district and the province with indirect election from the bottom upwards." (IV. 565 p. 1063-69, 4-7-44). Was he voicing JP's latest proposal ?

What was the real need of India ? Wavell thought it was "of technicians and leaders; half educated sweepers and *bhistis* and wild men of the hills can contribute little or nothing to the removal of poverty...." In his belief Wavell found Dr. Ambedkar a good supporter. He went on..... "Curiously it was Dr. Ambedkar alone of the Indians who advocated that money should be spent on (training of) leaders, technicians and businessmen rather than on the most backward." (WP p. 177; Oct. 1945).

About the future of scheduled castes too, there was detailed discussion and Amery had come to the conclusion that they should be represented in the Executive and that possibly after Gandhi's death, electoral arrangements be altered and direct communal basis substituted and revised upto date. In Amery's view, "their fundamental weakness was that they were neither one thing nor the other." He further thought that were they to turn Christians or Muslims *en bloc*, "it would be easier to legislate for them." (III-437 p. 630; 8-2-43). Incidentally about the educational effort of the Government of India, Wavell's admission holds good even today under Swarajya. "I think education is possibly the thing we have done worst in India," admits the noble Lord, "both from our own point of view and that of the Indians. We have allowed a bad system of advanced education to grow up unpractical, no development of character, concentration on examinations (which are very dishonestly run)." (WP p. 48, 12-1-44). How many of our Ministers have shown the boldness to admit this folly ? How many of them have been able to diagnose the evil so correctly ?

In addition to these dry as dust discussions, there are some very interesting passages in the state papers under survey. The first communication of the Secretary of State from London to the newly appointed Viceroy Lord Wavell, begins with almost a Biblical touch: Here beginneth the first epistle of Leo (Amery) the apostle, to Archie (Wavell) the pro-consul (IV-183 p. 401, 21-10-43).

Both Wavell and Linlithgow seem to be fond of writing. What long letters they have been writing weekly to London! Besides, Wavell kept a regular diary and was fond of poetry. The Viceroy and the Secretary of State seem to discuss books and poetry among themselves in the midst of political correspondence. But Linlithgow's deep affection is striking.

To Gandhiji Linlithgow wrote: Richard is the most and wonderful baby in the world and the very flower of the flock. (I-156, p. 213 20-2-42).

This Richard was no other than the grandson, daughter's son, of Linlithgow. Here is the picture of the universal grandfather. Even as every mother thinks her child to be the most charming baby in the world, so also

the grandparent prides in thinking his grand child as the most wonderful baby in the world.

In another letter a few months later, the grandfather Viceroy marks the rapid progress of Richard, now almost a year old, as a fine fellow and he has already taken charge of almost the entire household (II-221, 5-7-42 p. 308). The newly arrived baby in the home is generally the littlest emperor and Lord Linlithgow is showing that common manly feeling in spite of his high office. To Amery, he wrote in a lighter vein, after the arrival of the second grandchild: "My grand daughter is charming and she will call me Gandy-boy, (II-701, 5-9-42, p. 913) obviously referring to the Lord's handling of Gandhi.

When a successor to Linlithgow was to be found, the discussions between high officials were on an interesting level. Here are two instances of thinking aloud: (i) J. Anderson with Indian experience and much solid administrative capacity...has brightened up a bit since he married again, and she is an interesting woman, though not an altogether the type of a Vicereine... (ii) Ciss Asquith has got ability and character and has a very nice wife... but he is most decidedly a dark horse, comes from a stable where both political knowledge and intellectual ability have characterised all turned out by it (II-642, 27-8-42, p. 637).

This is how perhaps the better half dominates the world of man in high official circles. When Madame Chiang Kai-shek made a public statement that Pandit Nehru should be freed to throw India's weight into UN's cause... as he was a man with world vision... the Viceregal Lodge was terribly upset. When even American suggestions about Indian political situation were being strongly resented, how would the Viceroy Linlithgow accept advice gratis from Madame Chiang? He made strong protests to the Secretary of State and sought his help in stopping this sort of interfering with the domestic affairs of India.

When the Chiangs passed through India elaborate precautions were taken for conducting them properly to meet the Indian leaders. Diplomatic protocol was observed very carefully. They were tactfully requested not to visit Gandhi at Wardha even though the Chinese etiquette demanded them to do so. Instead, it was arranged that they should meet Gandhi at Santiniketan... But the special publicity the Madame got in the Indian press and radio, was something which was not much to the official liking. Between London and New Delhi, telegraphic wires whispered some interesting gossip. The basis of American interest in India was traced to the influence of two strong ladies at the White House: Mrs. Roosevelt and Madame Chiang: between themselves, they goaded Roosevelt to take interest in India, to insist on the release of Indian leaders... and this was romantically referred to as *Cherchez la femme*. When the Americans had gone crazy over their Chinese fair guest as was evident from the press and radio reports, again wires between New Delhi and London hummed with the French phrase: *Cherchez la femme*. At the meeting of the Big Four somewhere in the Middle East,

London reported that it was a meeting "of the Four all Highest plus feminine super all Highest." (III - 494 & 499; III - 662 & IV - 242).

That however is not all. There are other interesting reports about charming people. When the Chiangs stayed at the Viceréal House for some days and left for Chunking, Linlithgow reported to London about them. But he said more about the fair guest, the better half of the Generalissimo: "Madame is an amusing study. She is a typical product of the American Co-Ed system, complete with lipstick and "blue" stocking. She has a perfect command of the American language.... She is a typical American liberal, whose enthusiasms are unimpaired by any restraining considerations of a practical kind.... Underneath the Westernised layer of Madame's mind, I think I detect, a caution and a conservatism, which in fair fight would prevail over the more fleshy and spectacular elements in her nature. Her person is attractive and she dresses well. (I - 85 p. 136-7, 9-2-42).

Of a similar nature but of a different kind is the query raised by the Viceroy Wavell when he was perhaps thinking of inviting the Noons for lunch or tea. Sir Feroze Khan Noon, while abroad had contracted a second matrimonial alliance, with a non-Indian lady. The protocol-minded Viceroy was faced with a simple question: How should the second Lady Noon be addressed? (V - 240 p. 488-92, 30-1-45).

The problem which was worrying the Viceroy in Delhi was already solved, I was told by some roving diplomats, whom I met casually. They said, the first was Lady Noon and the 2nd was *Lady After-Noon*.

For many days, Linlithgow was flirting with the idea of adding charm and colour to his Council of Members, by wanting to ask Begum Shah Nawaz to join, as in-charge of Information and Broadcasting perhaps. She was Parliamentary Secretary, Punjab, (Education & Health) since 1937 and had returned from a tour abroad. She was nominated a delegate to the Pacific Relations Conference (at Mont Tremblant). She was also asked to visit places of Indian military interest. Reports about her and her work were quite flattering. So Linlithgow reported to Amery: : I found her excellent company. No one except President Roosevelt and one or two others could claim to be statesmen at all, according to her.... The Begum was delighted with her own operation (extremely successful) and is pleased with her conversation with Louis Fischer who told her: She had done her country more harm in a few weeks than any one could claim to have done in an indefinite period. (III 372-- p. 566, 30-1-43).

Is it not a good certificate to the excellent power of understanding of the American language by the Begum? Need any reason be given why she was not allowed to grace the Viceroy's Executive Council?

We have seen how Lord Linlithgow was overjoyed after he became the grand-father. That was great human quality of the Marquiss. Viscount Wavell does not seem to be so gifted. When it was known that Jawaharlal was to be a grand-father soon, somebody of the Linlithgow type raised a question whether he should be released on parole to see the face of his grand-child. The matter was tersely put: Nehru's daughter, Mrs Feroze Gandhi

was expecting a baby shortly.... We might be pressed to release Nehru on parole so that he might visit her.... Wavell was quite stern about the whole affair. If Mrs Gandhi was dangerously ill, we might transfer Nehru to Bombay and let him see her under escort. (IV - 670, p. 1213- 14, 23-8-44).

Wavell has also noted:

I should refuse to entertain any
such proposal. My colleagues agreed.

But he too was a father: his son had followed in the military footsteps of his father. He was on active service on the Eastern Front. The Wavells were naturally anxious about him. One day it was reported that Wavell's son had been badly wounded in Burma. "If they succeed in getting him out to a hospital in Eastern India I shall fly at once to see him." (IV-535 p. 1019-23, 12-6-44). Wavell did fly to Assam to see his wounded son. Later, Maj. Archibald J A Wavell was to fly home shortly to get an artificial hand fitted. His wound was healed up well and he was in good heart, reported Dad Wavell to Amery. (V-22; p. 44-6, 20-9-44). In due course Amery met Archibald Wavell in London and he cabled to New Delhi: "Your Archie - a really nice boy of whom you can feel proud." (V - 213 - 418, 18-1-45). What better tribute can a father like to hear about his son ? The human quality of Wavell was commendable but Linlithgow was far more human than his successor at the Viceregal House in Delhi.

These then are the lighter topics that provide the much needed relief in an otherwise rather heavy and dry reading. And before giving you further insight of the volumes, it is better to say: : enough unto the day the task thereof.

II

Three Viceroys are actually concerned with this operation, Transfer of Power; two of them seen through the Vols 1-7, are Linlithgow and Wavell. The remaining volume(s) will embody the doings of the third Viceroy, Earl Mountbatten.

Linlithgow, belonging to the Churchillian die-hard conservative school, did not think that transfer of power in India was so close at hand. The Viceroy who could not have any idea of the greatness of the Mahatma was not expected to know about the coming events. Like an honest custodian of the brightest jewel of the British Empire, Linlithgow acted with vigour and enthusiasm, brooking no curious eye about India, as it was the close preserve of the British people and none else, not even the Americans, was entitled to enquire about it.

It is therefore not surprising that such an authority showed signs of developing into an autocratic dictatorship. How many times has Linlithgow complained to Amery to stop the over-curious Americans from coming to India, even as the President's representatives. When some thing in the British press was not to the liking of the Viceroy, he enquired of Amery the way to put a stop to such material from coming into India. It was imposing censorship on incoming and outgoing messages for the press and printed stuff. Amery from London indicated in unmistakable terms to Linlithgow that censorship of the type the Viceroy wanted, was not possible (II - 80 & 106 - Feb. 42).

Arthur Moore, the Editor of the *Statesman* was not a favourite of the Viceroy. Why, his editorials were definitely annoying to him. The ruffled Viceroy was asking London to do something to stop this sort of journalistic mischief through Catto. Who was Catto ?

He was no other than Thomas Sivewright Catto, 1st Baron, great businessman, with Indian connection, Hon. adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer since 1940 and engaged in a similar capacity to Lady & Miss Yule, who were the proprietors of the *Statesman*. Moore and Catto appear frequently mentioned in Vol. II (Nos. 60, 133, 373, 425-26, 495).

But what great sin had Arthur Moore committed ? Obviously, he was not giving support to the Viceroy and to the Government of India. He was towing an independent line, criticising the Government, the Congress and the League for their impractical politics. Moore's approach and language were frivolous, from the official point of view. For instance, he had suggested that Sir Maurice Gwyer, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court be crowned

King of India and start an absolutely fresh page of history. (I - 626--14-4-42). On this, the Viceroy hastily cabled to London: "If things go bad in East Indian area we may have no choice but to muzzle Moore if he remains here."

Meanwhile some of the BBC broadcasts too were not favourable to Government of India. Linlithgow immediately cabled to Amery to do something to keep the BBC under control. The Viceroy thought it fit to remind the BBC and their officers that they were (during the War) under HMG's control. Linlithgow thought that the position here was too delicate to take chances. The date of the cable, 6th August 1942, clearly indicates the delicacy of the situation which had made the Viceroy so panicky.

Such wirepulling from behind the scenes by Linlithgow bore fruit and Moore was asked to retire from the editorial position of the *Statesman*. The Viceroy was very much happy at the incident and his joyous mood is reflected in his cable to Amery. (II-545 p. 698: 14-8-42) Linlithgow was careful to suggest to Amery that Moore's appointment as the Special Correspondent (in India) of the London *Times*, may be cancelled from London.

This is how power corrupts.... and absolute power corrupts... absolutely.

Of a similar nature but of quite a different kind was Wavell's suggestion to Amery to bury the myth of Col. Blimp in cartoon and gossip. The Viceroy was supported by his C-in-C. who thought, under the altered conditions, arising out of the World War II, when Indians were fighting shoulder to shoulder with the British and American soldiers, on many fronts, such a joke would do more harm than any good. So Amery was requested to bury the myth about Col. Blimp "in cartoon and gossip" Bellenger's article in *Sunday Pictorial*: C-in-C also thinks that it has a bad effect on the morale of the Services. (IV-670 p. 1216, 23-8-43).

But Wavell is at his best when he finds fault with the British Cabinet and its doings. When a Finance Member was being appointed against the recommendations of Wavell, the Viceroy angrily wrote to Amery:

"I was surprised and considerably annoyed at the proposal to appoint Donald Gordon. The Cabinet's lack of imagination in dealing with India is some times astonishing. They justify their refusal to appoint an Indian Finance Member by saying that their interest in the finances of India is so great that they must appoint an expert who will be absolutely safe. They then profess themselves unable to find a suitable man in the United Kingdom and produce a youngish Canadian who has never been heard of here and whose name does not, so far as I know, appear in any book of reference.....It is impossible to defend this sort of thing and your colleagues must stop trying to have everything both ways..... If they simply wish to appoint someone who will take a Treasury view on India's financial interests, they will find a stout opponent in the present Viceroy (IV- 333, p. 648-54, 18-1-44)

With such a strong opposition from the military Viceroy, it is needless to add, that Gordon was not appointed as India's Finance Member.

(1) Gordon Donald, Deputy Governor, Bank of Canada 1935-41; Chairman Canadian War-Time Prices & Trade Board since 1941.

With regard to supply of food grains to India the Viceroy was strong in stressing the urgency—

"I warn H M G with all seriousness that if they refuse our demand (of foodgrains) they are risking a catastrophe of far greater dimensions than the Bengal famine... They must either trust the opinion of the man they have appointed to advise them on Indian matters or replace him. (IV - 364 p. 706-7. 9-2-44)¹

Writing to Amery, Wavell stated in unmistakable terms :—

H M G have so far been extra ordinarily tactless and will now have to overcome many unnecessary difficulties of their own making. (IV - 607, p.1125-27-7-44).

After listing his recommendations which were turned down in London, Wavell observed that a hostile cabinet seems to have no confidence at all in my judgement on any matter. (IV- 660. p. 1199-1201, 15-8-44)

* *

"Statesmen of the Commonwealth," thundered a voice in London, "does it not strike you as an irony of fate of the first magnitude that India should have 2½ million men in the field, fighting and struggling to preserve the liberties of the nations of the Commonwealth and yet should be a suppliant for her own freedom?"

"How long do you think will she be prepared to wait ?

India is on the march;
You may help her,
You may hinder her,
But none shall stop her.

"India shall be free, within the Commonwealth, if you will let her, and accord her the place that is her due; without the Commonwealth, if you leave her no alternative."

The thundering prophet was no other than Sir Zafarullah Khan, whose speech in summary form was circulated among the members of the British Cabinet. (V- 295, p. 643-48; 2-3-45).

Although Zafarullah Khan was fully justified in stating the Indian case so forcefully our leaders both in the Congress and the League were either not prepared to accept the new responsibility or were finding faults with the proposed transfer of power. Perhaps it was like a confirmed bachelor, imagining many difficulties, real and unreal, before entering a householder's life.

The Congress and the League, were not prepared to accommodate and arrive at a joint understanding to receive power. They were not ready to run the administration together after the British left India. Before undertaking the stupendous task of making the constitution of a free India, the League wanted to part company with the Congress, thereby planning to have two different Governments and two constitution-making bodies for them, for India and Pakistan.

But the actual problems of transfer of power were not at all thought of by either the Congress or the League. The financial settlement with the British Government, the internal question of states, the responsibilities of defence, the services and their pensions, the British industrial and commercial interests, and a host of allied questions were there. Since there was hardly any constructive thinking on the part of agitators, it was a difficult task to bring them round a negotiating table to agree to a proposed procedure for a real transfer of power and consequent upon the division of the country, a proper division of assets, liabilities and responsibilities. These indeed were challenging jobs, requiring a lot of patience, tolerance and tact, in an unusually large measure. But none from amongst our leaders in both the camps, seemed to be in a mood to accept the challenge.

Three distinct efforts were made by the British to see whether Indians as such could be united in an effort to run the administration. (I) The Cripps' Mission-- (I- p. 460-756 23-3- to 11-4-42); (2) Simla Conference (V- p. 1086-1299; 3-6- to 28-7-45); and (3) Cabinet Mission (VII- 23-3- to 29-6-46).

The stages mark the change in the British attitude, from wanting to do some thing to appease the growing Indian demand for a greater participation in the administration to complete withdrawal by a definite date. On the side of the Indians there was however no such progressive change.

The negotiations were always long drawn and they were revolving round almost the same knotty points. The most intriguing among them was the nature of the representative character of the two contending parties. While the Congress and Gandhiji in particular, were strongly of the opinion that the Congress alone was the only representative body for all India and that it should be recognised as such, the League would not accept the view. The minorities too did not accept the Congress claim. But the main difference was between the Congress and the League. The League feared that the officials were partial to the Congress while the Congress openly charged the British of having fostered the League tendency. Cripps and others were meeting Gandhiji in the Bhangi Colony at Delhi, and so the League was more and more strengthened in its fears. The Congress got more and more suspicious because the British were not prepared to ignore the League altogether.

It was the same attitude of the Mahatma that prevented an attempt at presenting a united front while sailing for attending the 2nd R.T.C. When the representative character of other delegates was not recognised by Gandhiji during the Minorities Conference, it was Dr. Ambedkar who questioned the

statement of the Mahatma. At the time of the Yeravda (Poona) Pact only did the Mahatma recognise that Dr. Ambedkar really represented the Scheduled Castes.

A more realistic, accommodating and workable approach by the Congress, would have helped keeping the unity of the two parties longer. Was it not the elder party, with greater experience and wiser counsels? Linlithgow's expression that "the Hindus committed the mistake of taking Jinnah seriously and have given substance to a shadow" (II - 701, p. 913; 5-9-42) gains substance because of the Congress attitude.

The British Government had started the negotiations for a transfer of power. Was that an occasion of repeating all the charges which nationalist political leaders had been levelling against the British Government? An interesting interview between Gandhiji and Wavell is recorded by the Viceroy in which Gandhiji said that he had always tried for a settlement; but was frustrated by the British policy of *Divide and rule*. To this the Viceroy's reply was: "The British were accustomed to abuse and misrepresentation from Indian nationalists; but there was a limit. It seemed hardly wise to antagonise us at this moment when we are trying to bring about a settlement."

Wavell further told Gandhiji that India after getting her freedom would want Britain's co-operation in defence and commercial development.

Here the Mahatma's ready answer was: "**India needed no help from Britain in trade or defence.** She would develop her trade in her own way. *Her defence would be the moral force of non-violence which eventually would conquer the world and bring about universal peace.*"

In a subsequent interview with a high military officer Lt. Gen. Arther Smith, Gandhi complained that he had no trust in the British; they always broke their word. Gandhi went to the length of saying the Lord Wavell too had broken his word; he said he would make Simla Conference a success - and had not done so! (WP - p. 193 - 15-12-45)

Apart from this basic Congress-League opposition there were other points of difference. One was about the composition of the Indian cabinet. How many members of the two contending parties should be there? The League, from the beginning, insisted on a parity with the Congress. It is curious that Gandhiji who vehemently disputed this claim to parity of the League, himself followed the same principle of parity when he chose the representatives for meeting the Cabinet Delegation. His choice was Azad, Nehru, Patel and Frontier Gandhi.

Another speciality of the Congress party may be noticed in passing. On the British side the Cabinet Mission was so chosen as to assure maximum agreement. Cripps was a good friend of the Congress; he was known to Gandhi and Nehru. And so was Pethick-Lawrence. Alexander was not so

(1) The formula as agreed between Dr. Ambedkar, and Gandhiji, (pact) was accepted by British Premier, R. MacDonald and 26-9-32 & the fast ended.

intimate with the Congress and its leaders; but he was not prejudiced against it. Among the Congress delegates, there were elements more assuring a failure. Jinnah considered Azad the "circus boy" of the Congress and Azad on his part wanted to "crush" Jinnah. At the Viceroy's house, Jinnah refused to shake hands with Azad. And the Muslim League Leader wouldn't condescend to look at Frontier Gandhi. Can any body see the wisdom of such a choice? Was it for success or for definite failure that it was so composed?

Two intercepted letters, between Gandhiji and Maulana Azad throw light on the unprepared nature of our side. On the major question of Hindus and Muslims, in the legislature or in the Cabinet, there was no clear cut decision on the Congress side. Azad as the spokesman of the Congress held quite different views; but he had not expressed them anywhere. Much less had he discussed them amongst his colleagues on the Working Committee.

The Maulana wanted for the federating units, (i) the right to secede; (ii) joint electorates and reservation of seats on strength of population (iii) parity of Hindus and Muslims in Central Legislature and Central Executive and (iv) Head of the Union to be Hindu and Muslim by turn (VI-68 p. 155-57; 25-8-45). This is what Azad had written to Gandhiji on 2-8-45.

Gandhiji's letter was intercepted. He strictly forbade Azad to say anything about communal matters without consulting the Working Committee. "My opinion differs from yours," Mahatma told the Maulana and added "I don't like Hindu and Muslim as head of the state alternately. It debars other communities." (VI - 76 p. 172- 28-8-45). Both the intercepted letters were sent by Jenkins to Abel.

It is indeed surprising that on such an important topic, the Congress was not ready with a definite plan about the Hindu-Muslim relations.

We know how the recent detention of political leaders and their followers was exploited fully by them in forging a united front to the Congress party in power. Within a short time, they were successful in giving that party a good jolt and were further able to form a Janata ministry.

Why some thing of the sort was not done by the then *Quit India* Congress prisoners? They had a far longer time at their disposal and they had to stand up against the foreign British power. Perhaps the constructive thinking was not there; they still loved to talk in terms of a wider, stronger mass movement.

G. B. Pant's utterances sound more impractical. "We do not want our freedom as a gift from the Labour Government. We will win it inspite of them. I challenge the British Government and its allies to stop us if they can from achieving our objective." (VI- 210 - p. 485 Oct.- Nov. 1945).

Nehru's words were stronger: "If the country was not prepared for revolution to free herself, the nation was dead. Congress had never allowed the flag of revolution to be lowered." (*ibid*)

The Viceroy took these fiery words too seriously perhaps and was consulting Governors and military officers, what to do if the movement were started again. The availability of British troops and the possibility of using them to quell the riots or to maintain law and order, were problems being considered between Delhi and London.

In 1942, Gandhiji had said about the meaning of his demand for British withdrawal from India : "I have not asked the British to hand over India to Congress or to Hindus. *Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy.* Then all parties will fight one another like dogs or will, when responsibility faces them, come to reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos". (II - 171 p. 246 - 20-2-42).

It is doubtful if this was the view of Nehru or Patel. Certainly, it is not practical politics. But that was the way of the Mahatma. During the Dandi March, S. G. Sardesai¹ asked Gandhiji about his plans on reaching Dandi. "I shall wait for the inspiration from the sea", was Gandhiji's reply, showing again the same unpreparedness for facing the future. Perhaps he was in the habit of depending on God or Inner Voice. How the high officials were thinking of such a divine way of trusting the future to Gods, can be seen in one of Amery's despatches to Linlithgow. The Secretary of State writes : "The current Congress charged by Nehru that our administration is incompetent, is no doubt untrue, judged by the test of what a Congress Government would do setting itself to the same task."

Amery has disclosed his future plans for Indian development: "I am thinking of not only public works on a gigantic scale, financed by loan or by issue of paper, but of a wholesale re-building and replanning of villages re-grading of cattle, introducing new crop etc. etc. Might it not be our duty after the war to put ourselves in the position of a bold, far sighted and benevolent despot, determined in a few years, in a series of *five year plans*, to raise India's millions to a new level of physical well being and efficiency ? (II - 95 p. 141- 27-5-42).

British expert opinion was that at least for 20 years, the military supervisory personnel would have to remain in India. It meant that they would have to take orders from an Indian Defence Minister. Were they ready for it ? Was there an Indian competent to shoulder the responsibility of Defence ?

Recruitment of the Gurkhas was another knotty point. Would an independent Nepal and an independent India, like the Britishers to recruit the Nepali youth for their army ? Where would the actual recruiting office be located ? Shortage of manpower in UK, would necessitate the recruiting of the Gurkha soldier for many years to come for service in many parts of Asia and Africa. The Government of Nepal had agreed to allow Britain to recruit Nepali youth for its army was known. The unknown factor was the attitude of the new Indian government.

Then there were discussions about the actual form of Government of a new India. How many varieties of plans have been suggested and discussed between experts, before finally accepting one that was to be put before our leaders. The British parliamentary form of democracy was considered unsuited for India, mainly because of the illiteracy of the Indian people.

1) S. G. Sardesai, Communist member of Rajyasabha 1967-68.

form of government is talked of again and again. *Kindergarten* plan with which Milner was associated, had been seriously considered.

More serious than all the plans for the future, was the trial of I N A personnel. Were they to be considered as national heroes? Then what of those P O W s who did not join the I N A? Who was disloyal and who was loyal? Then I N A had been cruel to their brothers in arms who had not joined them. How were they to be brought to book? It was a complicated question more so because Lord Wavell and his C-in-C Auchinleck, were both military leaders and present in India, who had first hand knowledge of the actual happenings. It could not be considered right that all I N A personnel were in the right. Nor were all those who did not join them, in the wrong. It had been a touchy point and the honour of the army with a long tradition was at stake. It was not possible that both Wavell and his C-in-C would tolerate any such thing as lowered the prestige of the Indian army. Even the position of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was to be reconsidered.

As soon as the Japanese surrender was announced, all activity arising out of the cessation of hostilities started in real earnest. The repatriation of P O W s, bringing back the fighting forces from many lands, restoring normal conditions in Japanese occupied regions... all were being carried out as best as the joint effort of civil and military authorities could achieve. One of the most important worries of the officials was : What to do with Subhas Bose? If the Japanese surrendered, we should presumably require him to be handed over to us. What then? Should we try him in India? And if so by what kind of court? What about his chief collaborators? He is one of the bigger war-criminals and has offended against H M G quite as much against India." (V- 639 - 28-7-45; VI - 15,11-8-45)

I N A trials were no doubt an off-shoot of this kind of thinking. But Lord Wavell had the frankness to admit later in November 1945 that "it was undoubtedly a serious blunder to place on trial first, men against whom no brutality could be proved." (WP - p. 191). On the Indian side, Dr. Khan Sahab, the Congress Chief Minister of N. W. F. P, was outspoken in expressing himself. "If only the I N A had been shot in Rangoon or in Singapore, everyone would have been pleased." (*ibid*-p. 188)

Two newly coined terms were freely used in official reports about I N A and similar personnel in connection with activities of Subhas Bose in Europe and Asia. *HIFS* and *JIFS*. Hitler Inspired Fifth-columnists and Japanese Inspired Fifth -columnists. They were further classified as blacks, grays and whites. Dangerous for immediate release and responsible for criminal offences were the *blacks*; dis-loyal and over-drugged by enemy propaganda were the *grays* and while those whose loyalty was unquestioned were the *whites*. (VI- 17 p. 49; 11-8-45).

I N A: Some 70,000 men of the Indian Army fell into Japanese hand as P O W s. About 20,000 of these joined the newly formed I N A and it was commanded by a Sikh officer. He was soon removed and till the arrival of Netaji Subhas in the autumn of 1943, the I N A had no worthwhile head or occu-

pation, as it was not considered a worthwhile fighting force. A little over a third of the INA were classed as *blacks*. (WP p. 161-62).

The Defence Ministry is always careful - and rightly so, not to disclose the exact number or the composition percentage by major communities of the forces under their command. For a united India, in 1942, we had considerably less than a half of the Indian army than we have today. Its composition then was 63% Hindus and 37% Muslims. The Sikhs and the Nepalis were included among the Hindus. At that time Punjab's contribution to the fighting forces was 48% and Nepal's 11%. Bombay Presidency of the day, contributed only 4.5% consisting mainly of the Marathas (I- 180 p. 238, 25-2-42). Maj. Gen. R M M Lockhart said that Indian soldiers were "voluntary mercenaries." (*ibid* p. 312). During 1942-45, the total strength of fighting forces had exceeded ten lakhs.

To such a large unemployed force of actual fighters, non-combatants, demobbed from the Defence department, may be added an equally large or perhaps larger number of civilians engaged in industrial establishment producing defence materials. This combined unemployed force would prove an excellent raw material for agitators especially of the type the Congress had started during the *Quit India* movement. In the light of the threats of the Congress leaders for a greater struggle with the British Government, the Viceroy was naturally deeply concerned and his plea for a speedy solution of the Indian problem gained strength. In writing to the Prime Minister, after completing a full year of the Viceregal office, Wavell offered his own plan. In his estimate of the post-war situation, Wavell drew pointed attention to stark facts: Release of political prisoners, demobilisation and closing down of war factories and overgrown clerical establishments, will throw many people out of employment. They will find a fertile field for agitation unless we have previously diverted their energies into some more profitable channel i.e. into dealing with administrative problems of India and into solving the constitutional problem." (V-64 p. 126-33; 24-10-44).

The problem of the states, small and big, was not easy; already the Princes were clamouring for their treaty rights and the need to safeguard them. They had smelt the danger ahead; they knew that changing order was round the corner; but they thought that their position was quite safe under the British Crown. They were not prepared for a complete withdrawal of the British. When the position became clearer, they got nervous. Actually none could save them. The antics of the Nizam are worth noting as they are a class by themselves. First, he tried to assure the Crown Representative that he was on the right path and that he need not take the agitators seriously. Then he kept his forces and a part of his treasury at the disposal of the Crown through the Viceroy. And along with each such move, he kept on asking when the Berar was being restored to him. But the climax was reached when through the Nawab of Chhatari he asked for a new title, "King of the Deccan and Berar", and help in buying Goa as a suitable opening to him on the Western Coast in addition to his claim on Masulipatam. (VI. - 135, p. 319 - 9-10-45).

The Nizam changed his Diwans quite often and they in turn went to Delhi, either to call on the Viceroy or to place before the Mission or the Delegate the claims on behalf of the Nizam. One of the Nizam's boast was that he had not joined the Chamber of Princes (as all the members were far below his own rank) and had not allowed the Congress organization any foothold in his dominions.

One of such advisers of the Nizam was Sir Walter Monckton, who seems to be responsible for suggesting to His Exalted Highness the idea of demanding from the Viceroy an access to the sea via Masulipatam, with a corridor for unrestricted passage. The proposal was seriously considered in London and India Office had noted that evidence (not available to Hyderabad) strengthened the Nizam's case for a right of access to Masulipatam and a corridor. The Nizam demands for Masulipatam were under Treaty rights of 1802 although in 1935 and 1939 they were rejected outright. (VI-377 - p. 840-1, 24-1-46 VI 459 - p. 1042-43, 22-2-46)

Wavell visited Hyderabad as Nizam's guest and he has left quite an interesting account of the hospitality. The family details are described with a humorous touch. - (V- 156; 20-12-44 and W P p. 105). Most striking, however, is the description of the Earl of Munster, who said that he had almost handed him (the Nizam) his hat and stick, thinking he was a servant. (V - 182 p. 360-64; 4-1-45).

The practical wisdom of the British diplomats is strikingly seen in (i) keeping the Nizam well humoured without wounding his eccentricity and whimsical vanity as also in (ii) maintaining a close watch, fully prepared to meet the exigency of (the Nizam's death) the accession of a new ruler (V 621 -p. 1265-68; 16-7-45).

The resources of Hyderabad state were at the disposal of the British. At one time, the idea of taking shelter in Hyderabad territory after withdrawal from independent India was mooted, thinking that the Nizam would not join either Union for some time. Another idea that the Viceroy played with was to start giving autonomy to India in parts, to the Deccan first, the southern half of the sub-continent, where the problem of Muslim separate entity did not arise (VII - 407 p. 731-37; 30-5-46).

The Nizam himself had expressed his dreams of remaining aloof from the one or other Union. But for himself, he did not want the British to so depart for good from India. He did not like the idea of an Indian Minister or an Indian secretary of the Political Department. He of course preferred a British officer for such an important post, as it had to deal with a "unique" state like Hyderabad, which was bound to maintain its identity under all circumstances. The Nizam's wish however was that even an independent India should remain in the Commonwealth. (VII - 490 p. 868-69; 11-6-46).

The political and administrative reforms that were long over due in Hyderabad state were kept ready, waiting for a suitable opportunity, accession of a new ruler. The unlimited and unlisted wealth of the Nizam and the like-

lihood of a variety of numberless claimants, had been anticipated and adequate provisions made for meeting such exigencies. That shows the alertness and practical wisdom of the British resident at Hyderabad. (V- 621 p. 1265-68; 16-7-45)

"Liberty does not descend to a people. A people have to raise themselves to Liberty," is a well known dictum, engraved in New Delhi on an arch of an entrance to the South Block (Secretariat). How did we try to raise ourselves to that heavenly gift?

We had hardly any time for such a preparation. During the non-cooperation movement (1930-32), we were busy with *breaking* of salt and jungle laws, *boycott* of schools, colleges and courts, *picketing* foreign cloth shops and toddy or wine shops. . . . and *courting* arrests and offering no defence when we were tried in a court of law, thus helping to fill the jails.

During the *Quit India* movement, we were busy with more drastic measures. We were no longer the peaceful non-co-operators. We had become more violent. *Cutting* of telephone and telegraph wires, *looting* of public treasuries, *disrupting* rail transport, *destruction* of public property. . . . all were considered patriotic deeds, bringing swarajya nearer*. During Gandhiji's fasts however, we indulged in some sort of a constructive activity, in arranging prayer meetings and trying to bring pressure on Government to release our leader, the Mahatma. Thus our leaders too had little idea of what constructive work was involved after receiving the heavenly gift of liberty. That is why perhaps that in all the three conferences, our leaders cut a sorry figure. They could not negotiate well for taking upon themselves the responsibility of running an administration. Through the eyes of the Viceroy, our heroes looked like this. Linlithgow says: "Though Gandhi has very many likeable qualities and my personal relations with him have always been extremely good, he is an insuperable obstacle to progress, HMG is trying to bring about in India for so long." (III- 438 p. 639; 8-2-43). Wavell's judgement was not quite different. Outlining the work of the Cabinet Mission Viscount Wavell reported to H M the King : Gandhi ran entirely to form : his influence is still great; his line of thought and action at any given moment and on any particular issue is as unpredictable as ever. . . . ; but however double-tongued he may be, he is quite single-minded on his one objective, the elimination of the hated British influence from India. . . . (VII - App. 2). At another place, Wavell estimated Gandhi as an odd mixture of benevolence and malevolence. "I should put the composition of his character as 70% extremely astute politician; 15% saint and 15% charlatan." (VI - 322 p. 713-15; 31-12-45)

"Jinnah exists on being as rude to Government and to his political opponents as he thinks he dares. He would be as bad a master as Gandhi. He is also not in as strong a position as Gandhi". . . . This is what Linlithgow thought of the Leader of the Muslim League (III- 769; p. 1052 ; 10-6-43). Wavell found Jinnah "a curious character, a lonely, unhappy, arbitrary, self-

* Complete set of instructions, stage by stage issued by Andhra PCC in (II-407 P. 557-8 4-8-42)

centred man, fighting with resolution, what I fear is a losing battle." (VII - App 2). About Jawaharlal Nehru*, Wavell records :: I have seen much of Nehru and cannot help liking him. He is sincere, intelligent and personally courageous. But he is unbalanced and also lacks the political courage to stand up to Gandhi when he knows he is wrong. (VII - App 2).

Wavell seems to be struck by Sardar Patel more than anyone else. He found Sardar "the recognised tough of the Congress Working Committee and by far the most forcible character amongst them. I have a good deal more respect for him than most of the Congress leaders and he is probably the only one of them capable of standing up to Gandhi. If he takes the line of Constitutional progress, he may be valuable; if he goes to the left, he will be formidable." (VII App 2).

Two Viceroys who dominate the 7 vols., offer a grand study in contrast; their attitudes towards India, towards Britain and the world in general were quite different. Linlithgow was a civilian, with experience of India as the Chairman of the Royal Commission on Agriculture (1926-28) while Wavell was a Field Marshall with previous contacts with India as her C-in-C. Linlithgow's term of office extended to a little more than 7 years (1936-43) while Wavell's was not even half of that period (1943-47). From the beginning of his term as Viceroy, Wavell was wanting to do something to better the Anglo-Indian relations. Two inner urges were goading him to do his bit for satisfying Indian aspirations: (i) India deserved a drastic improvement in her status and (ii) British prestige in the world demanded such a change quickly. Such urges did not seem to bother Linlithgow. He was satisfied to keep India safe and protected. He was not much concerned with the aspirations of the Indians. Wavell on the other hand, was a liberal, who had been and felt the signs of the changing times. About the role of Gandhi both Linlithgow and Wavell seemed to be of the same opinion. After Gandhi's death, however, Wavell recorded that Gandhi was by any standards a very remarkable man (WP. 439, 1-2-48).

Linlithgow had no occasion to fly home for consultations during his long term; while during his short term, Wavell was in London twice. Linlithgow had not to suffer the displeasure of the Prime Minister or the British Cabinet. Wavell's lot was miserable. Churchill soon began to repent for his choice of Wavell as Viceroy; he would not attach any importance to the Viceroy's views. Churchill did not want the military Viceroy to dabble in civil matters. Liberality of Wavell was not at all liked by the British Prime Minister. The outspoken Field Marshall did not seem to impress the other members of the British Cabinet either. The new British Prime Minister, Attlee, was prejudiced against Wavell from the beginning probably for two reasons :: (i) that Wavell was Churchill's choice and (ii) that being a high military official, he

* Jenkin's note about J. Nehru for Wavell is worth reading in full. This is how a secretary helps his boss in getting to know men properly. (V - 552) "There are many crooks in the Congress - unscrupulous people with a craving for power or money; but Jawaharlal is not one of them." * Editorial Epilogue WP p. 447.

was not well suited for civilian administration. That is why perhaps Attlee, dismissed Wavell with but a month's notice. The office of the Crown Representative in India deserved a better deal at the hands of the Labour Prime Minister... Their correspondence on this point is worth reading (VII-App.)

Within a week of his arrival in India, Wavell did two great things: (i) he flew to Calcutta for a tour of famine-stricken Bengal and (ii) invited a conference of all provincial Governors in Delhi. The previous Viceroy did not pay much attention to Bengal because constitutionally the Presidencies were autonomous and food was not a Central subject. Wavell thought otherwise. Apart from the constitutional position, the human aspect of the famine was far more important and when the civil authorities were not upto the task, he *called in the military to help the administration in handling the difficult situation*. At the Governors' conference held after many Viceroys had come and gone, Wavell sized each head of the region and noted his evaluation thus :—
...I was favourably impressed by Arthur Hope (Madras) whom I had discounted; rather he seemed to me to know his province very well, to be administering it energetically and efficiently, and to talk good horse sense.

I like the look and talk of Colville (Bombay) very much, he admits his lack of knowledge of India but has the character and ability that counts in any situation.

Rutherford (acting for Bengal) confirmed the impression I had formed in Calcutta that he was second-rate at best; frankly, I do not think he is really trying hard in Bengal now, and the impression he left on me was very poor. Rutherford is top second class; definitely not in the first. Bengal needs a Governor with a fire in his belly. It is magnificent opportunity for a first class man who is ready to sacrifice his immediate prospects to do work of the highest importance to the prosecution of war. (VI - 199; p. 434; 1-11-43.)

Maurice Hallet (U P) I have known for many years; a first class administrator and a man of courage and character, but perhaps a bit disillusioned and cynical about India.

Glancy (Punjab) is good but inclined to go with the tide and not very eager to take a firm line with his ministers; but he is all right. Glancy's political training inclines him to be the Punjab Ministry's advocate with me than rather my advocate with the Punjab Ministry. (VI - 213 p. 450; 8-11-43).

I have not quite made up my mind about Twynham (C P) most certainly but a little opinionated and inclined to talk for effect.

Mudie (Bihar) is quiet and sensible; hardly the man I should say for a tough job though.

Cunningham is first class in N-W F P, which has comparatively few problems and merely needs a man of character and sense which Cunningham has.

Lewis is all right for his dim province of Orissa, as long as nothing startling happens there.

Dow (Sind) talked more horse sense than any one though a bit provocative at times; he has Sind well in hand.

Clow (Assam) reminds me of a remark once made by a very celebrated golf professional, "a nice little golfer, Sir, a nice little golfer Sir", you know what I mean." Clow, I think is a nice little Governor, but nothing more (IV-238-p. 494, 23-11-43).

Of the Bengal Ministry, Wavell noted :—

They did not really know what was happening. They are pleasant enough to deal with but are not in any sense leaders, are far too sensitive to political criticism and opposition. Shurawardy, the food minister is reputed to be the strong man of the cabinet; his faults are verbosity, lack of method and his officials find him far from easy to work with.

The Bengal administration was a mass of corruption and dishonesty from top to bottom and that the pilfering and misappropriation of food grains were on such a scale as to make relief measures largely ineffective. (IV-213, p. 455-61; 8-11-43).

On Gandhi-Jinnah talks, Wavell thought—

Gandhi-Jinnah talks ended on a note of complete futility.....The two would have got down to something if only the best way to embarrass the Government of India. Anything so barren as their exchange of letters is a deplorable exposure of Indian leadership. The two great mountains have met and not even a ridiculous mouse had emerged.

This surely must blast Gandhi's reputation as a leader. Jinnah told Gandhi that division of India was only on his lips and did not come from his heart. (WP- p. 91, 30-9-44)

But a dejected Wavell deserves our sympathy—

It has been my fate for the last 5 or 6 years to have to conduct withdrawals and to mitigate defeats. I have had no real opportunity of a success. This is inevitably depressing. (WP p. 403— 31-12-46).

By bringing a fresh blood into Governorships in India, there was at once a transformation in outlook at that high level. The British governors had seldom thought on constructive lines. R. G. Casey was the Australian Governor of Bengal (1944-46) and during this short regime, he did much to attract favourable Indian attention. He was respected because he refused to be decorated before assuming office. When Churchill offered him the Governorship, he was asked what decoration he would prefer. Casey's reply was very simple. He wanted to remain a plain Mr., a commoner to contest Australian elections after his term of office. He was accepting the post as a war time task, without an honour or even a title, if that was permitted. It was the time honoured tradition that Governor must atleast be a Knight and decorated with G C I E. An exception was made in the case of Casey.

The new Governor was looking for irrigation engineers. He wanted to construct large dams. The Britishers did not know much about high dams or the problems of river deltas. Wavell noted at the time that an American expert was invited by Punjab to advise them on the construction of Bhakra dam across the Sutlej. (IV-670, p. 1215; 23-8-44). About the reclamation of the Sunderbans however, an early suggestion was made by Edward

Thompson that the use of Jai Prakash (Narayan) should be made to reclaim the bad characters in that world (of Sunderbans) as J P was quite influential. It seems the fame of J P in reforming bad characters (Chambal dacoits, smugglers etc ?) was known to Thompson from so early days! Amery suggesting to Linlithgow about this in 1942, means that the proposal must have been engaging the attention of the Bengal Government earlier (I - 375- p. 470 24-3-42). As J P was in prison at the time and there were others bearing Narayan as the name, some confusion arose over actual identification.

Casey's report about conditions in Bengal was well appreciated in London. (IV- 538, p. 1028-31, 20-8-44).

About the terrorist crime, Casey noted that 1300 Bengali youths were locked up, only a dozen among them were Muslims and a single one belonged to the depressed classes. Casey did not like the use of army men using rifles when controlling the civil riots. The rifle was a weapon and as such it was not useful in civil life. "One does not kill these poor people; one only wants to frighten them and stop them from doing the stupidities that politicians have driven them to." "I don't want to declare war on the public and kill them." Such a bold and realistic view was not taken by any Governor any any where in India before (VI - 235, p. 538-9, 23-11-45).

But Casey's great triumph was that Mahatma Gandhi went to him and talked very freely and for long hours for many days. In one of the entries in his diary, he humourously notes that the morning papers reported that M. Gandhi did *not* see Casey yesterday. Gandhiji was struck by the informality of the Governor and by his refusal to accept a title.

After a longish dose of serious, politician narration, may I now turn to a little nonsense, found here and there in these bulky tomes ? It has been well said that—

*A little nonsense now and then
Is cherished by the wisest men.*

When it was reported that Sir Stafford Cripps was likely to visit India Linlithgow was annoyed. His indignation on reading the press reports was conveyed to Amery: You will dissuade him and if possible prevent further reports about any such visits, effect of which would be in my view, disastrous (I-79, p. 127, 7-2-42).

But even Linlithgow could not order the waves to stop. Amery was kind and considerate to Linlithgow and so he gave a private tip to him. "Please take the strongest peg you can before continuing to read the cable." Then follows the actual message that Prime Minister was broadcasting.... (about Cripps visiting India) (I-101, p. 131, 11-2-42). Why was the Viceroy worried about Cripps ?

"My position in Indian eyes should be protected in all that the PM may say, about Cripps in his visit on behalf of the British Cabinet.

More than that, The question of protocol worried the Viceroy still more. Cripps would be staying at the Viceregal Lodge. What was his order of pre-

cedence ? He would normally receive the rank of a Cabinet Minister, (other than the Secretary of State). that is of a Privy Councillor, immediately after the Members of my Council. Was that in order asked the Viceroy. (I - 307, p. 406; 11-3-42).

About this Cripps Mission, a story was current that it was carefully organised to get Nehru the front-rank position to become the Prime Minister of India. As soon as it was known as such, Vallabhbhai Patel vowed that he would torpedo the whole scheme. Sir C P Ramaswami Aiyer told this to Linlithgow as from Patel's mouth (II-566 p. 723; 16-8-42).

Here's a specimen of Churchillian court language regarding the Mahatma: "It now seems almost certain that the old rascal will emerge all the better from his so called fast. . . . How foolish those cowardly ministers now look who ran away from the bluff and sob-stuff crisis. . . . Your (Linlithgow's) own strong cool, sagacious-handling of the matter has given me the greatest confidence and satisfaction." (III- 553 p 744-28-2-43).

After congratulating Linlithgow for a successful deflating of Gandhi and his fast, Hope from Madras, found fault with the arrangements about publicity. Hope thought that Gandhi got too much publicity for his fast. On getting this complimentary letter, Linlithgow observed on it that next time he would arrange for Gandhi's fast in Madras to see how Hope manages it. (III-561, p762-3; 3-3-43).

Mountbatten and Wavell were good friends. Before Wavell's successor was announced, they had met many times and had free talks on a variety of topics. When in London, Wavell told Mountbatten, what sort of tussles he was having with H M G re: India. That made Mountbatten wiser and before assuming office in New Delhi, he had obtained clear-cut instructions, as he wanted them, so that he was a freer perhaps the freest Representative of the Crown in India. That apart, his liking for films and Wavell's for books are well brought out in the extract from Wavell Papers :—

Mountbatten is a great film-fan. He apparently has one most nights so much easier and quicker than reading a novel, — he urged.

But I don't read novels, I said.

What then do you read for relaxation ?

I read biographies and poetry rather than novels.

But don't you like musical films ?

I fear I am not musical.

But you don't need to be a musical to enjoy musical films.

M-B is still youthful and I am afraid I received the impression that I was a cheerless kill-joy not to like films. (WP-p. 40; 7-12-43).

How did Mountbatten become a Viceroy ?

Who recommended Mountbatten's name ?

Lady Willingdon had suggested this name to Pethick-Lawrence and he passed on the recommendation to Attlee. (VI-391; p. 871-2; 30-1-44)

Maharajahdiraj of Benares was a guest of the Nawab of Rampur. The guest house at Rampur was on the 1st floor and it was the Maharaja's wont

to cast his first eyes on a cow after getting out of bed. The Nawab wanted to be a perfect host. Nothing was difficult for him. A rigged platform was erected for the cow to stand on, waiting for the Maharaj to cast his eyes on the holy mother. But how was the cow to be raised to the height of the platform? A crane from an adjoining sugar factory was brought to raise the cow to the level of the platform and she looked so astonished and out of sorts.... But the Maharaj was pleased and so was the host. (WP- p. 65; 15-4-44).

Wavell did a lot of touring, particularly because of the problem of states which he wanted to understand. His visit to Cochin-Travancore was quite interesting to him. He could not understand the matriarchial social order among them and he observes -- 'No one has explained this to me-- Fraser's *Golden Bough* is silent and *Encyclopaedia Britannica* vague;' that's how Wavell was curious.

The Cochin Maharaja was about 80, with a little command of English. His prospective successor is above 75..... There are some 200 in the succession line now alive, a little prospect of a ruler succeeding much under the age of 70 for any foreseeable period ahead. (WP - p. 113, 17-2-43)

For such a studious Viceroy, for one who had been in India for many years before as C-in-C, this howler is unbecoming: "The Telegus and Tamils are all non-Brahmins and Ramamurty, one of the official advisers, Madras Governor, is a Brahmin." (V-77, p. 160; 28-10-4344.)

Here's a dig at the American efficient way of management: American way of handling of Assam Railways resulted in 33 derailments and 6 collisions, although throughout 1942, under Indian management there were only 6 derailments. (IV-670, p. 1213-23; 23-8-44-)

And finally, in thanking you all for a patient listening, may I recommend to you a novel Viceregal way of keeping fit, as suggested by Amery to Linlithgow? This is what the Secretary of State writes to the Viceroy:—

Do you pursue that particular form of physical training which consists in throwing a pack of cards into the air when you get out of bed and picking them up individually so as to supple your waist and spine? Fitness plus a good seasoning of philosophy is the best recipe for seeing through work like ours in these times. (I — 375, p. 468-71; 23-3-42)

I picked up Alice through the looking glass one evening shortly before the end of the Mission and wrote the parody below; I put it down here, but doubt whether it is really worth preserving.

JABBER WEEKS

(from Phlawrenoe through the Indian Ink)

Twas grilling; and the Congreelites
Did harge and shobble in the swope;
All Jinsy were the Pakistanites,
And the spruft Sikhs outstrope.

Beware the Gandhiji, my son,
The satyagraha, the boggy fast,
Beware the Djinnarit, and shun
The frustrious scheduled caste.

He took his crippsian pen in hand,
Long time in draftish mood he wrote,
And fashionees as his lethal brand
A cabimissionary note.

And as he mused with pointed phrase,
The Gandhiji, on wrecking bent,
Came tripling down the bhangy ways,
And woffed as he went.

Ek do, Ek do, and blow on blow,
The pointed phrase went slicker snack;
And, with dhوتي, the Ghose and goat, he
Came chubilating back.

And hast thou swoozled Gandhiji!
Come to my arms, my blimpish boy!
Hoo-ruddy-ray! O Labcur Day,
He shabashed in his joy.

Twas grilling; and the Congreelites
Did harge and shobble in the swope,
All jinsy were the Pakastanites,
And the spruft Sikhs outstrope.

This poem will not be understood without the NOTES added by the poet himself under the nom-de-plume Hobson-Jobson.

Grilling: : is in hot weather at Delhi when everyone's brains are grilled before 2 p. m. and don't get ungrilled till 2 a.m.;

Congrelites: : are animals like congereels, very slippery they can wriggle out of any thing they don't like.

Harge : : is a portmanteau word; it means haggle and argue. To **shobble** is to shift and wobble; a **Swope** is a place open to sweepers.

Pakstanites: : are rather fierce noisy animals, all green, they live round mosques and can't bear Congreelites.

Spruft : : means spruce and puffed up; **Outstrope** means that they went round shouting out that they weren't being fairly treated and would take direct action about it. But the Sikhs don't quite know what it does mean yet.

WAVELL
(W. P. - p. 315-6)